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Abstract
The present study emerges from research that discusses a distinction between local 
and systemic manifestations of oppression. Local context refers to meaning in the 
immediate situation, whereas systemic context refers to broader meanings. The 
purpose was to examine effects of simultaneous local privilege and systemic 
disadvantage on motivation and performance outcomes. Specifically, it examined 
effects of sexist humor using three conditions—women-disparaging, men-
disparaging, and control jokes—on women's career interest and math performance. 
The men-disparaging condition provided a test of simultaneous privilege in the local 
context of men-disparaging jokes, but systemic disadvantage in context of a math 
setting. Tentative results suggest effects of local and systemic context may be 
contingent upon the domain of interest. Women's interest in masculine careers 
increased in the men-disparaging condition. Women indicated standardized tests were 
more unfair and showed a pattern of lower math performance in both gender-
disparaging conditions.
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1Sexist humor: Local and systemic manifestations of privilege and disadvantage
Surfing the web at work or flipping through television channels at home, one is 
likely to encounter sexist jokes like the following example:
Q: How do you know when a woman says something smart?
A: When she starts her sentence with "A man once told me..."
What are the effects of exposure to such jokes? Research on women's response to 
women-disparaging jokes reveals, unsurprisingly, that women find humor that 
disparages women less funny than humor that disparages other groups such as 
lawyers (LaFrance & Woodzicka, 1999). Beyond the issue of amusement, it is likely 
that such jokes harm women's feelings of gender-group positive distinctiveness 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986), with negative consequences for domain identification, 
motivation, and performance. In contrast, such jokes may boost men's positive 
distinctiveness, perhaps with positive consequences for domain identification, 
motivation, and performance.
This sort of women-disparaging joke is probably a prototypical case: that is, what 
comes to mind when people imagine the concept of sexist humor. But what about 
men-disparaging jokes: do they constitute a form of sexist humor? For example, 
consider a parallel, men-disparaging version of the previous joke.
Q: How do you know when a man says something smart?
A: When he starts his sentence with "A woman once told me..."
2What are the effects of exposure to jokes like these? Taking a cue from the 
adjective "men-disparaging", one might imagine that this joke would enhance positive 
distinctiveness for women but harm positive distinctiveness for men. In turn, one 
might expect that such jokes would not harm—and might even boost—women's 
domain identification, motivation, and performance. Reflecting this expectation, 
people may often engage in such men-derogating humor as an exercise in women's 
empowerment.
Diverging from this viewpoint, a sociocultural perspective suggests a radically 
different conclusion. Rather than positive distinctiveness within the circumscribed, 
local context, the more consequential features of the joke may be its links to relatively 
distal, systemic oppression. Rather than an exercise in women's empowerment, men-
disparaging jokes may constitute an equally harmful form of sexist humor that 
contributes to women's oppression.
Previous Research on Sexist Humor
Reflecting prevailing understandings of "sexist humor", much of the 
psychological research on the topic focuses on the negative consequences of exposure 
to women-disparaging humor. More specifically, this research has considered such 
outcomes as tolerance of discrimination towards women (e.g. Ford, 2000; Ford, 
Boxer, Armstrong, & Edel, 2008; Ford & Ferguson, 2004; Ryan & Kanjorski, 1998) 
or the relationship between anti-women sexist attitudes and funniness ratings of 
3women-disparaging sexist humor (e.g. Greenwood & Isbell, 2002; Thomas & Esses, 
2004; Moore, Giffiths and Payne, 1987). 
For instance, prejudiced norm theory (Ford & Ferguson, 2004) posits that 
exposure to disparaging humor—like exposure to ethnic slurs or statements that 
implicitly condone racism (Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994; 
Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985)—increases discrimination (and tolerance of 
discrimination) toward targets of the humor. This occurs through the creation of a 
"norm of tolerance" of discrimination implied by the humor. For individuals who 
score high on measures of prejudice, this norm serves to regulate the amount of 
tolerance allowed for discriminatory behavior. For example, when men high in hostile 
sexism are exposed to sexist jokes, they subsequently rate a vignette in which a 
supervisor makes sexist remarks to a female employee as less offensive than 
individuals who were exposed to neutral jokes or sexist statements (Ford, 2000; Ford, 
Wentzel, & Lorion, 2001). Exposure to sexist jokes also predicts the willingness of 
men high in hostile sexism to donate money to a women's organization and to cut 
funding from the budget of a women's organization as compared to other 
organizations. Specifically, men high in hostile sexism donate less money and cut 
more funding for women's organzations after exposure to women-disparaging sexist 
jokes (Ford et al, 2008). The authors explain these patterns in terms of different 
motivations to respond without prejudice. Because men who are low in hostile sexism 
presumably have more internalized standards of non-prejudice, their attitudes and 
4behavior do not vary in response to the sexist jokes. In contrast, because men high in 
hostile sexism presumably have more externally regulated motivations to respond 
without prejudice, their behavior varies as a function of perceived social norms 
(Monteith, Deenen, & Tooman, 1996; Ford et al, 2008). 
While most research on sexist humor considers its sexism-promoting effects on 
men who overhear women-disparaging humor or the relationship between ratings of 
women-disparaging humor and sexist attitudes, less research focuses on women's 
experience of sexist humor (LaFrance & Woodzicka, 1999). LaFrance and 
Woodzicka (1999) studied women's verbal and non-verbal responses to women-
derogating jokes. Their analysis revealed that women were less amused, were more 
disgusted, rolled their eyes more frequently (a sign of contempt), and touched their 
faces more often (possibly a sign of embarrassment) as compared to a control group 
who received lawyer derogating jokes.
Although the present paper considers the detrimental effects of exposure to 
disparagement humor, researchers have proposed that disparagement humor, even of 
the ingroup-disparaging variety, might have positive, liberating functions. (e.g. Datan, 
1986; Martineau, 1974 ; Meyers, 2000). With respect to intergroup relations, theorists 
suggest that humor is a "double-edged sword" that can serve both uniting and 
dividing purpose (Meyers, 2000; Datan, 1986). Particularly relevant to the present 
study, theorists note that a valuable function of humor is identification (Martineau, 
1974; Meyers, 2000). In the case of identification, humor functions to build support 
5for the communicators by identifying them with the audience and building 
cohesiveness within the group (Meyers, 2000) and researchers document the 
beneficial effects of identification for disadvantaged groups (Schmitt & Branscombe, 
2002; Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobynowicz, & Owen, 2002).
To summarize, research suggests that sexist humor harms women indirectly 
through discrimination towards women on the part of male observers of sexist humor 
(e.g. Ford, 2000; Ford et al., 2001; Ford et al., 2008; Ford & Ferguson, 2004). It also 
suggests that women find such women-derogating humor unappealing and offensive 
(LaFrance & Woodzicka, 1999). Other research suggests that the effects of humor are 
not all detrimental; humor can serve to unite as well as divide. However, to my 
knowledge there is no published research on the direct effects of exposure to sexist 
humor on women's experience beyond ratings of funniness or non-verbal responses to 
women-disparaging humor.
Detrimental Effects of Sexist Humor: Two Competing Accounts
The present study takes the case of sexist humor to illuminate the differences 
between two accounts of the detrimental effects of sexist oppression. One account 
emphasizes the local dynamics of sexist humor, especially the extent to which it 
results in outgroup derogation or positive distinctiveness. The other account 
emphasizes the broader systemic dynamics of oppression that shape interpretation of 
local events. 
6Outgroup Derogation and Positive Distinctiveness
A common framework for understanding intergroup conflict is to examine 
intergroup experience in terms of positive distinctiveness and outgroup derogation 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1999). From this perspective, situational influences 
affect understanding of self- identity as more or less interpersonal or intergroup 
(Turner, 1999). The interpersonal dimension refers to an understanding of the self and 
the other as individuals, rather than members of particular social categories (e.g. a 
relationship between old friends or partners) and the inter-group dimension of identity 
refers to an understanding of the self and others as members of specific social 
categories. (e.g. soldiers on opposing sides of a war; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
This framework places special emphasis on the local context as a determinant of 
whether one experiences one's identity at the interpersonal or inter-group level. Local 
context also determines the social groups with which self and others categorize at any 
moment, since any person is a member of several social categories. Furthermore, 
when people are in an intergroup context, they strive to maintain their group's 
positive social identity through group comparison. This positive social identity 
through intergroup comparison is referred to as positive distinctiveness. 
Given this approach, humor that disparages the ingroup threatens ingroup positive 
distinctiveness. This threat to group positive distinctiveness explains why ingroup 
members find jokes that disparage their ingroup less amusing than jokes that 
disparage a different group (Bourhis, Gadfield, Giles, & Tajfel, 1977; LaFrance & 
7Woodzicka). In the case of sexist humor, exposure to women-disparaging humor is 
likely to threaten women's positive distinctiveness. This threat to positive 
distinctiveness suggests that women might experience negative outcomes as a result 
of exposure to women-disparaging humor.
The preceding discussion has focused on detrimental consequences of woman-
disparaging humor. What about exposure of women to men-disparaging humor? 
Although ingroup-disparaging humor might harm positive distinctiveness, an 
emphasis on local context and local relevance suggests that outgroup-disparaging 
humor can boost ingroup positive distinctiveness and identification (Bourhis, et al., 
1977; Martineau 1972; Meyer 2000; Ruscher, 2001). From this perspective, one can 
expect that exposure to outgroup, men-disparaging humor will increase women's 
positive distinctiveness. In turn, this increase in positive distinctiveness may lead 
women to experience positive or buffering outcomes as a result of exposure to men-
disparaging humor—especially to the extent that it increases gender identification 
(Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey 1999; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002; Schmitt, 
Branscombe, Kobynowicz, & Owen, 2002).
A Sociocultural Approach to Systemic Devaluation
In contrast to a focus on positive distinctiveness and outgroup derogation within 
the circumscribed joke situation, a sociocultural approach (Adams, Biernat, 
Branscombe, Crandall, & Wrightsman, 2008) to systemic devaluation identifies the 
source of oppression in the structures of the social world. Such structures include cul­
8tural models and social representations that make up a sociocultural atmosphere of 
oppression and afford continued devaluation. A key aspect of the sociocultural ap­
proach to systemic oppression is the dynamic, mutually constituting nature of the re­
lationship between the individual and the sociocultural environment (Kim & Markus, 
1999). This sociocultural perspective implies a different set of research directions 
than what currently guides the psychological literature on sexist humor. First, a socio­
cultural approach locates the roots of sexism and sexist attitudes not inside the minds 
of hostile sexists, but instead in the sociocultural worlds which reproduce both sexist 
humor and an understanding that such humor is amusing (e.g. in artifacts such as dis­
paraging comic strips or jokes on the internet). Second, a sociocultural approach sug­
gests that detrimental effects of sexist humor are not limited to the individual actions 
of hostile sexists who enjoy women-derogating humor. Instead a sociocultural ap­
proach suggests taking the perspective of women to examine how sexist humor as a 
cultural artifact affects women's experience and outcomes. 
Oppression Absent Differential Treatment
The aforementioned implications of a sociocultural approach draw attention to op­
pression that occurs absent differential treatment. This approach highlights how op­
pression is impactful because sociocultural structures can call to mind the broader 
systemic nature of oppression. (For example, a joke or a comic strip may not include 
differential behavior beyond words, but it serves as a reminder of broader devalua­
tion.) Additionally, this approach highlights that the reproduction of oppression and 
9devaluation does not depend on direct acts of negative treatment. Research in social 
psychology illustrates examples of oppression absent direct discrimination. The fol­
lowing section highlights some of this research.
Identity threat. One example of oppression that does not necessarily entail 
differential treatment is research on identity threat. Identity threat is the wide set of 
concerns that come about when some aspect of the environment signals danger that a 
person might be evaluated on the basis of a threatened social identity (Adams, Garcia, 
Purdie-Vaughns & Steele, 2006; Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). 
Identity threat can be divided into four classes (see Branscombe et al. 1999): 
acceptance threat, threat to group value, distinctiveness threat, and categorization 
threat. The last of these classes, categorization threat, is most relevant for discussion 
of oppression absent differential treatment. Categorization threat refers to 
categorization against one's desire. Considering the example of sexist humor, a 
gender-derogating joke makes gender group membership salient. The salience of 
gender group membership can lead to categorization based on gender and should be 
threatening to a woman who does not want to be categorized by gender in that 
situation.
Stereotype threat. Stereotype threat (Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995) refers 
to a "threat in the air" that can harm important outcomes such as performance, 
motivation, and long-term engagement in a stereotyped domain. This threat can occur 
due to the presence of a mere reminder of a negative stereotype of one's group's poor 
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performance (Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002). Stereotype threat is a prime example 
of oppression absent differential treatment because it does not require negative 
treatment on the part of individual actors, but instead occurs as potential targets 
struggle with the implications of social representations of their group (Adams et al, 
2008). The large literature on stereotype threat (e.g. Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 
1995; Spencer, Steele & Quinn, 1999; Steele, 2002) provides examples of such 
systemic disadvantage. 
Self-stereotyping. A few researchers suggest that some (O'Brien & Hummert, 
2006) or all (Wheeler & Petty, 2001) of the performance decrements associated with 
stereotype threat may be due to a process of self-stereotyping. Self-stereotyping 
occurs when environmental cues activate group-based schemas that include automatic 
links between stereotypes and behaviors associated with the stereotype about one’s 
group (Wheeler & Petty, 2001; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Stereotype threat 
and self-stereotyping differ mainly on the process involved. The explanation for 
stereotype threat performance decrements is a "hot" motivational process, whereas 
self-stereotyping relies on a "cold" cognitive explanation (Wheeler & Petty, 2001). 
Like stereotype threat, self-stereotyping relies on pre-existing understanding of the 
domain which arises through continuous engagement with a world in which 
stereotypes of one's group exist as social or cultural representations. Regardless of the 
specific process—stereotype threat or self-stereotyping—these performance 
decrements resonate with a sociocultural approach to oppression to the extent that 
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they illustrate how associations to broader systems of oppression can trigger harmful 
outcomes, even in the absence of differential treatment within a circumscribed 
instruction setting.
Oppression manifest in positive treatment
Not only does oppression occur in the absence of differential negative treatment, 
but it can also occur through apparently positive treatment towards the oppressed 
(Adams et al., 2008). For example, research on benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 
2001) highlights how even apparently positive attitudes or biases towards women are 
not benign, but serve to justify gender inequality and hostile attitudes towards women 
who do not conform to traditional gender roles. More generally, a sociocultural 
perspective suggests that positively-valenced treatment—in the present case, men-
disparaging humor that contributes to women's positive distinctiveness in a 
circumscribed testing situation—can result in harmful outcomes if it also primes 
associations to more general systemic and structural oppression that devalues women. 
Local and systemic forces
Because potentially positive treatment can cause negative outcomes for the 
disadvantaged by priming associations of broader oppression, it is necessary to 
distinguish between impacts at differing contextual levels. This distinction between 
local and systemic contexts is evident in at least two programs of research.
First, research on the rejection identification model notes that, although the local 
relevance of attributions to discrimination may appear similar, the consequences of 
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these attributions vary as a function of the different total relevance that they have for 
people from advantaged and oppressed groups. (Branscombe et al.,  1999; Schmitt & 
Branscombe, 2002; Schmitt et al., 2002). Attributions to discrimination will likely 
incur more harmful psychological consequences for people from relatively 
disadvantaged groups because the total relevance of the attribution includes the 
broader system  of oppression that transcends the local context. In contrast, 
attributions to discrimination will likely incur less harmful psychological 
consequences  for relatively advantaged group members because the total relevance 
does not include a broader system of oppression. In  short, the total relevance or 
meaning of attributions to discrimination differs for advantaged and disadvantaged 
groups because of their different positions in the social structure.
Beyond attributions to discrimination, research on the effects of a suggestion of 
sexism (Adams, Garcia, Purdie-Vaughns, & Steele, 2006) also makes a distinction 
between local and systemic context. An important contribution of this research is its 
consideration of the effects of simultaneous disadvantage and advantage at local and 
systemic levels. In one of these studies, researchers exposed men and women to the 
suggestion by a confederate that a different-sex instructor "seemed sexist" (Adams et 
al., 2006, Study 3). They found that one negative outcome—discomfort concerning 
the instruction situation—affected both men and women. That is, both men and 
women exposed to the suggestion about gender bias of a different-sex instructor 
reported less comfort in an instruction situation than participants who were not 
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exposed to the suggestion. However, the effects of the suggestion had radically 
different consequences for women and men on a subsequent logic test. Results for 
women indicated that the mere suggestion of sexism, even in the absence of direct 
differential treatment, was sufficient to undermine women's comfort in the instruction 
situation and lower their performance on the logic test relative to women who did not 
receive the suggestion. In contrast the parallel suggestion did not have the same 
negative effects on men's performance, even when they were supposedly the target of 
a woman's anti-male bias. 
One can understand men's outcomes as a function of simultaneous local 
disadvantage and systemic privilege (see Figure 1). Men in this study were 
disadvantaged in the local context as a function of the suspicion that a female 
instructor "seems sexist". Yet they were privileged at the systemic level relative to 
women as a feature of the logic domain. Men exposed to the suggestion of sexism 
about a female instructor reported less comfort, which suggests that the experience of 
local disadvantage did have some negative impact. However the systemic advantage 
appeared to buffer (and perhaps even enhance) men's performance, despite their local 
disadvantage. This pattern is consistent with the phenomenon of stereotype lift, 
whereby systemic privilege in the form of positive stereotypes about performance (or 
negative stereotyped performance of another group relative to ones own) can increase 
performance for advantaged group members in those privileged domains (Walton & 
Cohen, 2003). However, the contribution of this study was to demonstrate that the 
14
beneficial effects of systemic privilege can occur even when the same event that 
triggers stereotype lift—the suggestion that the female instructor is biased against 
men—constitutes a form of local disadvantage.
Figure 1: Pictorial representation of men’s outcomes in Adams et al (2006).
In contrast to men, women in the study experienced disadvantage at both the local 
and systemic levels, as a function of the suggestion of sexism and a systemic feature 
of the logic domain. Because women were disadvantaged at both contextual levels it 
is unclear which had more drastic consequences: the local dynamics of outgroup 
derogation implicit in the suggestion of sexism, per se, or the broader disadvantage 
relative to men as a feature of logic domains.
The Present Study
The present study examines a similar distinction between local and systemic 
forces. However, whereas previous research has investigated the simultaneous impact 
of local disadvantage and systemic privilege on men's experience (Adams et al., 
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2006), the present study investigates the simultaneous impact of local privilege and 
systemic disadvantage with respect to women's experience (Figure 2). Specifically, 
this study examines women's outcomes in a math test setting after exposure to 
women-disparaging, men-disparaging, or non-gender disparaging jokes. For multiple 
reasons—including social identity threat, self-stereotyping, and harm to positive 
distinctiveness—various theoretical perspectives suggest that women in the women-
disparaging joke condition should experience more harmful outcomes than women in 
the control condition. However, the men-disparaging condition provides a means to 
test two competing hypotheses.
Figure 2: Pictorial representation of women’s experience in the men derogating joke 
condition.
The first hypothesis follows from a focus on local advantage provided by the 
men-disparaging jokes.  To the extent that men-derogating jokes promote positive 
distinctiveness of women relative to men and women-disparaging jokes decrease 
positive distinctiveness of women relative to men, one can hypothesize that this local 
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advantage will lead to more positive outcomes for women in the men-disparaging 
condition than women in the women-disparaging condition.
In contrast to this local advantage hypothesis, the second hypothesis follows from 
a focus on the broader implications of gender disparagement humor in a context of 
systemic oppression. This systemic disadvantage hypothesis, inspired by a 
sociocultural approach, suggests that both women-disparaging and men-disparaging 
jokes direct attention to the broader systemic devaluation of gender in math domains. 
Accordingly women exposed to both women-disparaging and men-disparaging 
conditions will lead to worse outcomes than women in the control condition.
METHOD
Participants
I recruited women (N = 117) from introductory psychology courses at the 
University of Kansas (KU) to participate in the study for course credit requirements. 
Procedure
Participants enrolled in the study via an online recruitment system. A male 
experimenter administered the study in sessions of one or two people so that 
participants would remain unaware of the gender selection criteria. He explained that 
the study examined the relationship between humor, career interests, and math test 
performance. Participants took approximately 45 minutes to complete the study. 
17
Measures
Joke Manipulation
Women participated in one of three conditions which differed only in the joke 
rating measure. In the women-disparaging condition, women rated a series of 14 
jokes (Appendix A-I) on a 1 to 7 scale (1 = not at all funny, 7 = extremely funny). Of 
these 14 jokes, 5 disparaged women and the remaining 9 included no gender 
references. In the men-disparaging condition women received the same joke rating 
measure except that the 5 gender-disparaging jokes targeted men (Appendix A-II). In 
the control condition the measure contained the same 9 non-gender referencing jokes 
and one additional joke that also did not mention gender (Appendix A-III). The 
experimenter administered joke measures in envelopes to remain blind to condition. 
Career Ratings
After the joke manipulation, participants rated the likelihood they would pursue a 
list of 28 possible careers (Appendix B). I selected this list of possible careers from a 
directory of careers for psychology majors posted on the University of Kansas career 
center website (University Career Center, 2006). Inclusion of the career measure 
allowed for detection of changes in women's motivation to pursue particular careers, 
and more specifically the gendered nature of such career motivations.
In a pretesting phase, a separate group of 12 women undergraduates categorized 
each of the careers as stereotypically feminine, stereotypically masculine, or neither 
feminine or masculine. I computed composite career scores by averaging careers 
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placed in the same gender category by at least 9 of the 12 pretest participants (75%). 
The feminine category included 5 careers (caseworker, daycare center director, 
teacher, school psychologist, and school counselor; α = .82), the masculine category 
included 2 careers (probation parole officer and computer programmer; α = .095)1, 
and the neither category included 6 careers (training specialist, consumer 
psychologist, health policy planner, consumer researcher, media director, and public 
opinion survey worker; α = .61). 
Pre-test
Following the career measure, participants in the study completed a measure 
adapted from Steele and Aronson (1995). On this measure (Appendix C) participants 
wrote how many hours they slept the night before and rated on a 1 to 7 scale how able 
to focus they felt, how much stress they had been under lately, and how tricky/unfair 
they find standardized tests. The first three of these questions constituted a measure of 
self-handicapping—excuses that suggest a concern about the evaluative implications 
of one's poor performance. Previous research (Steele & Aronson, 1995) found that 
participants under stereotype threat indicated greater self-handicapping. To compute a 
composite self handicapping score I reverse coded participants' ratings for the items 
able to focus and hours slept, standardized both of these reverse coded items and 
1Because of the extremely low reliability probation parole officer and computer programmer results 
appear separately in footnotes.
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participants ratings of stress, and then computed the mean of these standardized 
scores to create a composite score of self-handicapping for each participant (α = .50)2. 
Math Test
Next, the experimenter gave participants 25 minutes to complete a math test 
(Appendix D). This math test contained 22 math questions adapted from a Scholastic 
Assessment Test (SAT) practice manual (Stephens, 2006).
Word Completion
After the math test, participants completed a word completion test (Appendix E). 
This word completion measure consisted of 18 word stems, including 12 stems 
associated with "feminine" words (e.g. _ _ _ AN = woman, _ INK = pink) and 6 
stems associated with "self-doubt" words (e.g. FA _ _ = fail, W_ _ K = weak). I 
designed the measure to assess differences in feminine and self-doubt activation as a 
result of the experimental manipulation. To the extent that disparagement humor has 
detrimental effects,these effects may work by cuing self-doubt or associations to 
gender (and therefore gendered stereotypes).
Post-test Questionnaire
After the word completion measure participants completed a post test 
questionnaire (Appendix F). Items on the questionnaire referred to participants 
performance on the math test (their expected performance compared to KU students, 
effort, and how important it is for them to do well on similar tests), as well as a series 
2Single item analyses reveal similar patterns of non-significant results so I report the composite scores 
despite moderately low reliability.
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of judgments about which of two groups would perform better on the math test and 
the word completion test. Besides the focal comparison of men to women, the set of 
comparisons included English majors to Psychology majors, KU students to Kansas 
State University students, high school math teachers to engineers, and 18-year olds to 
58-year olds. Self ratings of effort, performance, and importance of the math test 
examined whether participants explicitly indicated differences on these dimensions, 
whether actual differences or because of self-handicapping. Questions about whether 
women or men do better on math tests and the word completion tests were designed 
to examine whether participants beliefs about gender differences in test performance 
changed as a function of gender salience or as a function of positive distinctiveness.
Debriefing
As a final procedure, the experimenter probed participants for suspicion and then 
informed them about the true nature of the experiment. As a manipulation check, he 
directly asked participants whether their joke rating measure included any jokes that 
made fun of women, any jokes that made fun of men, or did not include any jokes 
that made fun of women or men. 
RESULTS
I report two sets of analyses in the results for each dependent measure. First, I 
report analyses for all participants. Second, I report analyses from a refined sample 
that excludes data from 24 participants who expressed suspicion about the true nature 
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of the study (n=3) or who failed the manipulation check (i.e., could not recall which 
jokes they received, despite a prompt that described all three conditions; n=21). 
Analytic Strategy
To analyze results, I performed two orthogonal contrasts (Table 1). The first 
contrast tests the systemic disadvantage hypothesis: specifically, that participants in 
the gender disparagement conditions (i.e., both women-disparaging jokes and men-
disparaging jokes) suffer worse outcomes than women in the control condition. The 
second contrast tests the local advantage hypothesis: specifically, that participants in 
the men-disparaging condition experience better outcomes than participants in the 
women-disparaging condition. Because these hypotheses are directional, I report tests 
of associated contrasts using one-tailed probabilities (see Furr & Rosenthal, 2003, 
footnote 1). Furthermore, although the primary focus of analyses is planned contrasts, 
I follow convention by reporting omnibus tests, and when appropriate, post-hoc tests.
Table 1. Planned contrasts corresponding to the systemic disadvantage and local 
advantage hypotheses. Direction may vary based on specific measure.
Women- 
disparaging
Men- 
disparaging Control
Systemic Disadvantage (C1): -.5 -.5 1
Local Advantage (C2): -1 1 0
Joke Manipulation
I created a composite score of joke funniness ratings by averaging each 
participant's score across all the jokes on the joke manipulation measure (see Table 2;
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α all jokes, gender disparagement conditions = .87; α non-gender jokes, all conditions = .79). The omnibus ANOVA 
for all participants indicated joke funniness ratings did not differ by condition F(2, 
116) = .20, p = .82, η2p = .004. The omnibus ANOVA for the refined sample also 
indicated that the effect of condition on was not significant, F(2, 90) = .77, p = .47, 
η2p = .017.
In addition to overall joke ratings, I also created a composite rating of the gender 
related jokes in the women-disparaging and men-disparaging conditions (αall participants 
= .89). Including data from all participants, women rated the women-disparaging 
jokes significantly less funny than the men-disparaging jokes t(79) = -2.22, p = .03, 
η2p = .059. Participants who passed the manipulation check (i.e., the refined sample) 
also rated the women-disparaging jokes significantly less funny than the men-
disparaging jokes (or the men-disparaging jokes significantly more funny than the 
women-disparaging jokes) t(59) = 2.46, p=.02, η2p = .093. Consistent with the 
literature on positive distinctiveness and humor (Bourhis, et al., 1977; Martineau 
1972; Meyer 2000; Ruscher 2001), this pattern suggests that women found the same 
jokes less problematic (and more funny) when the jokes derogated men than when the 
jokes derogated women. 
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Table 2: Joke funniness ratings by condition.
Joke type: Women- 
disparaging
Men-
disparaging Control
All Participants
   All jokes 3.13 (1.08) 3.23 (.83) 3.27 (.89)
   Gender jokes 3.19 (1.63) 3.85 (1.04) -----
Refined Sample
   All jokes 3.05 (1.06) 3.34 (.81) 3.22 (.90)
   Gender jokes 3.15 (1.63) 4.02 (1.10) ----
Career Ratings
 I conducted a 3 x 3 mixed-model ANOVA with career category (masculine, 
feminine, neither) as a within-subjects variable and joke condition (women-
disparaging, men-disparaging, control) as a between-subjects variable3. 
Results with all participants revealed a marginally significant effect of joke 
disparagement condition, F (2, 112) = 2.44, p = .09, η2p= .042. Tukey's post hoc tests 
3Including all participants, results of this mixed-model ANOVA with masculine composite score reveal 
a similar pattern when calculated separately with each of the masculine careers. Results of the 
probation parole officer in place of the masculine career composite score revealed a significant effect 
of career category F(2, 113) = 59.10, p < .001, η2p = .343 , approached significance for effect of joke 
disparagement target condition F (2, 113) = 2.35,  p = .10, η2p = .040, and reveals no significant 
interaction F (4, 113) = .67, p = .62, η2p = .012. Results of the computer programmer in place of the 
masculine career composite score again revealed a significant effect of career category F(2, 112) = 
76.58, p < .001, η2p = .406, approached significance for effect of joke disparagement target condition F 
(2, 112) = 2.09, p = .13, η2p = .036, and revealed no significant interaction F (4, 112) = .87, p = .48 η2p 
= .015.
Including only participants in the refined sample, results of this mixed-model ANOVA with 
masculine composite score reveal a similar pattern when calculated separately with each of the 
masculine careers. Results of the probation parole officer in place of the masculine career composite 
score revealed a significant effect of career category F(2, 89) = 39.96, p < .001, η2p = .310 , a 
significant effect of joke disparagement target condition F (2, 89) = 3.22,  p = .05, η2p = .068, and no 
significant interaction F (4, 89) = .62, p = .65 η2p = .014. Results of the computer programmer in place 
of the masculine career composite score again revealed a significant effect of career category F(2, 88) 
= 56.38, p < .001, η2p = .391, a significant effect of joke disparagement target condition F (2, 88) = 
3.20, p < .05, η2p = .068, and no significant interaction F (4, 88) = .30, p = .88 η2p = .007.
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across all career categories reveal that participants in the men-disparaging condition 
indicated significantly more career interest than participants in the control condition 
but did not differ from participants in the women-disparaging condition. Participants 
in the women-disparaging condition did not differ from participants in the control.
Results for the refined sample revealed a significant main effect of joke 
disparagement condition, F (2, 88) = 3.55, p = .03, η2p = .075. Tukey’s post hoc tests 
across all career categories revealed that participants in the men-disparaging 
condition indicated significantly more career interest than participants in the control 
condition but did not differ from participants in the women-disparaging condition 
(see Table 3 for estimated marginal means). Participants in the women-disparaging 
condition did not differ from participants in the control.
Results including all participants revealed a significant main effect of career 
category, F (2, 112) = 82.12, p <.001, η2p =.423, such that participants expressed 
greatest interest in feminine careers and least interest in masculine careers . Results 
with participants in the refined sample also revealed a significant main effect of 
career category, F (2, 88) = 58.94, p <.001, η2p =.401, such that participants expressed 
greatest interest in feminine careers and least interest in masculine careers.
Although the Career Category x Joke Condition interaction was not significant 
whether examining data for all participants F (4, 112) = .92, p = .45, η2p = .016 or for 
the refined sample, F (4, 88) = .46, p = .76, η2p = .010, inspection of cell means in 
Table 3 suggests that the effect of joke condition was mainly evident for ratings of 
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interest in the masculine and neither career categories, but not feminine careers. To 
explore this possibility, I performed one-way ANOVAs of the joke-condition factor 
for each career category.
Table 3: Estimated marginal means and standard error of career interest category by 
condition.
Women-
disparaging
Men-
disparaging Control
Total 
across conditions
All participants
Feminine 3.50 (.24) 3.53 (.22) 3.04 (.24) 3.36 (.14)
Masculine 1.57 (.16) 1.85 (.14) 1.67 (.16) 1.70 (.09)
Neither 2.53 (.16) 2.87 (.14) 2.33 (.16) 2.58 (.09)
Total across 
careers
2.53 (.14) 2.75 (.12) 2.35 (.14)
Refined Sample
Feminine 3.43 (.27) 3.56 (.27) 2.99 (.27) 3.33 (.16)
Masculine 1.56 (.16) 2.03 (.16) 1.58 (.16) 1.72 (.09)
Neither 2.48 (.17) 2.86 (.17) 2.31 (.17) 2.55 (.10)
Total across 
careers
2.49 (.14) 2.81 (.14) 2.30 (.14)
Feminine career interest. Including data from all participants, the omnibus 
ANOVA for feminine career interest revealed no effect of condition, F (2, 116) = 
1.37, p  = .26, η2p = .023. The first planned contrast (indicating lower career interest 
in the gender-disparaging conditions than the control) did not reach significance 
t(114) = -1.64, p = .95. The second planned contrast (indicating lower career interest 
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in the women-disparaging condition than the men disparaging condition) did not 
reach significance t(114) = .16, p = .44.  
Including data from only participants in the refined sample, the omnibus ANOVA 
of feminine career interest revealed no effect of condition F(2, 90) = 1.28, p = .28, 
η2p = .028. The first planned contrast (predicting lower career interest in the gender-
disparaging conditions) did not reach significance t(90)= -1.55, p = .94. The second 
planned contrast (indicating lower interest in the women-disparaging condition than 
in the men-disparaging condition) was not significant t(90)= .40, p = .35. Feminine 
career interest did not decrease in the women-disparaging and men-disparaging 
conditions relative to the control. Participants in the women-disparaging and men-
disparaging conditions did not differ in feminine career interest.
Masculine career interest. Including data from all participants, the omnibus 
ANOVA for masculine career interest4 was not significant, F (2, 115) = .94, p  = .40, 
η2p = .016. The first planned contrast (indicating lower career interst in the gender-
disparaging conditions) did not reach significance t(113) = -.30, p = .62. The second 
planned contrast (indicating lower career interest in the women-disparaging condition 
4Due to the low reliability of masculine career interest items I performed omnibus ANOVAs for the 
probation parole officer and computer programmer careers separately with all participants. Although 
not significant, F (2, 116) = 1.57, p = .40, η2p = .016, the pattern of means for probation parole officer ( 
Mwd = 1.68, SDwd = 1.18 ; Mmd = 2.05, SDmd = 1.49; Mc = 1.75, SDc = 1.16) was similar to the masculine 
career composite. The first planned contrast did not reach significance t(114) = -.42, p = .79. Thee 
second planned contrast did reach significance t(114) = 1.28, p = .10. The computer programmer 
results revealed a similar pattern  (Mwd = 1.44, SDwd = .94 ; Mmd = 1.66, SDmd = 1.22; and Mc = 1.56, 
SDc = 1.34), F (2, 115) = .33, p = .72, η2p =.006. Neither the first contrast t(113) = .02, p= .49. nor the 
second contrast t(113) = .81, p= .21. reached significance.
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than the control) did not reach conventional levels of significance t(113) = 1.32, p 
= .10. 
Including data from only participants in the refined sample, the omnibus ANOVA 
of masculine career interest5 revealed a significant effect of condition F(2, 89) = 3.10, 
p = .05, η2p = .065. The first planned contrast did not reach significance t(89)= -1.21, 
p = .89. However, in this case, the second planned contrast did yield significant 
results t(89)= 2.15, p = .02. Tukey's post hoc tests revealed a moderate difference 
between the men-disparaging (M = 2.03, SD = 1.03) condition and both women-
disparaging (M = 1.55, SD = .67) and control (M = 1.56, SD =.84) conditions. 
Overall, results suggest that jokes in the men-disparaging condition increased 
women's interest in masculine gendered careers relative to jokes in both the women-
disparaging and control conditions.
Neither-gender career interest. Including data from all participants, the omnibus 
ANOVA for careers categorized as neither masculine nor feminine reached 
significance, F (2, 115) = 3.37, p  = .04, η2p = .056. The first planned contrast 
(indicating lower career interest in the gender-disparaging conditions) did not reach 
5Due to the low reliability of masculine career interest items I performed omnibus ANOVAs for the 
probation parole officer and computer programmer careers separately with only participants in the 
refined sample. Like the composite of masculine career interest, the ANOVA for probation parole 
officer (Mwd = 1.63, SDwd = 1.13 ; Mmd = 2.32, SDmd = 1.66; Mc = 1.72, SDc = 1.05) revealed a 
moderately significant effect of condition  F (2, 92) = 2.54, p = .08, η2p = .053. The first planned 
contrast did not reach significance t(90) = -.91, p = .82. However the second planned contrast did reach 
significance t(90) = 2.06, p = .02. Although not significant, the computer programmer results revealed 
a similar pattern  (Mwd = 1.45, SDwd = .99 ; Mmd = 1.74, SDmd = 1.26; and Mc = 1.41, SDc = 1.01), F (2, 
91) = .87, p = .43, η2p =.019. Neither the first contrast t(89) = -.79, p= .78. nor the second contrast 
t(89) = 1.04, p= .15. reached significance.
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significance t(113) = -1.93, p = .97. The second planned contrast reached significance 
t(113) = 1.65, p = .05 indicating that participants in the men-disparaging condition 
showed more interest in non-gendered careers than participants in the women-
disparaging condition. Tukey's post hoc tests revealed that participants in the men-
disparaging condition (M  = 2.87, SD = .98) indicated more interest in the non-
gendered careers than participants in the control condition (M  = 2.33, SD = .92). 
Participants in the women-disparaging condition (M  = 2.53, SD = .90) did not differ 
from either the men-disparaging or control conditions.
Including only participants from the refined sample, the omnibus ANOVA of 
careers categorized as neither masculine or feminine revealed a marginal effect of 
condition F(2, 89) = 2.81, p =.07, η2p = .059. The first planned contrast did not reach 
significance t(89)= -1.74, p = .96. The second planned contrast approached 
significance t(89)= 1.59, p = .06. Tukey's post-hoc tests revealed that participants in 
the men-disparaging condition showed significantly more interest in the neither-
gender careers than participants in the control condition, but did not differ from 
participants in the women-disparaging condition. Participants in the women-
disparaging condition did not indicate significantly more interest in the neither-gender 
careers compared to participants in the control. These results indicate that gendered 
disparagement humor did not decrease interest in the neither-gendered careers relative 
to the control; however the men-disparaging jokes did increase women's interest 
relative to women-disparaging jokes.
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In summary, results of these ANOVA suggest that the main effect of joke 
condition in the overall 3 x 3 analysis was mainly a function of ratings for male-
gendered and neither-gendered careers. Specifically, participants in the men-
disparaging condition expressed greater interest in masculine-gendered and neither-
gendered careers, but did not express greater interest in feminine-gendered careers, 
than did participants in the women-disparaging and control conditions.  Because the 
corresponding 3 x 3 interaction implied by this differential effect of the manipulation 
across career condition was not significant, one must interpret results of this analysis 
with appropriate caution. However, the overall pattern—especially the observation 
that men-disparaging jokes increase women's interest in pursuing careers that are 
considered masculine—is consistent with the local advantage hypothesis. Perhaps 
because the men-disparaging jokes increase women's positive distinctiveness relative 
to men, the masculine careers seem more interesting or less threatening.
Pre-test
Self-handicapping. Including data for all participants, the omnibus ANOVA for 
the self-handicapping composite did not differ by women-disparaging (M = -10, SD = 
.67), men-disparaging (M =  .06, SD = .76), or control (M = .06, SD = .66) conditions 
F(2, 116) = .70, p = .50, η2p  = .012. Neither the first planned contrast (indicating 
greater self-handicapping in the gender disparaging conditions), t(114)= -.61, p = .73 
nor the second planned contrast (indicating greater self-handicapping in the women-
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disparaging than in the men-disparaging condition), t(114)= -1.04, p = .85 reached 
significance. 
Including data for only participants in the refined sample, the omnibus ANOVA 
for the self-handicapping composite did not differ by women-disparaging (M = -10, 
SD = .69), men-disparaging (M = -.01, SD = .65), or control (M = .05, SD = .66) 
conditions F(2, 89) = .42, p = .66, η2p  = .009. Neither the first planned contrast t(89)= 
-.75, p = .77 nor the second planned contrast t(89)= -.52, p = .70 reached 
significance. The self-handicapping measure does not differ by condition.
Test unfairness. Including data for all participants, the omnibus ANOVA for the 
tricky/unfairness item differed significantly by condition  F(2, 116) = 4.22, p = .02, 
η2p  = .069. The first planned contrast reached significance t(114)= 2.90, p = .002. 
The second planned contrast did not reach significance  t(114)= .02, p = .51. Tukey's 
post hoc tests likewise confirm that the participants in the women-disparaging 
condition (M = 4.19, SD = 1.31) and men-disparaging condition (M = 4.18, SD = 
1.48) rated standardized tests as more unfair than did participants in the control 
condition (M = 3.33, SD = 1.59). The men-disparaging and women-disparaging 
conditions did not differ.
Including data for the refined sample, the omnibus ANOVA for the tricky/unfair 
item (Figure 3) revealed a significant effect of condition F(2, 90) = 4.16, p = .019, η2p 
= .085. Tukey's post hoc tests indicated that this effect was due to an increase in 
women's ratings of the trickiness of standardized tests in both women-disparaging and 
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men-disparaging conditions relative to the control condition. The men-disparaging 
and women-disparaging conditions did not differ. Consistent with post hoc results, 
the first planned contrast was significant t(90)= 2.87, p < .01 and the second planned 
contrast was not significant t(90)= .27, p = .39. These results support the systemic 
disadvantage hypothesis; that is, both types of gender derogating jokes increased 
participants' perceptions of the tricky/unfairness of standardized tests relative to 
control jokes.
Figure 3: Data from refined sample. Mean response to the item "How tricky/unfair do 
you find standardized tests? " 
Math test
To calculate math test scores I awarded 1 point for correct answers, -0.25 points 
for incorrect answers, and 0 points for no answer, consistent with SAT scoring 
practices. 
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Overall math test. Including data for all participants, the omnibus ANOVA for the 
overall math test was not significant F(2, 116) = .55, p  = .58, η2p  = .010. Participants 
in the women-disparaging (M = 6.29, SD = 3.71), men-disparaging (M = 5.69, SD = 
2.75), and control (M = 6.41, SD = 3.65) conditions did not differ. Neither the first 
contrast t(114) = .63, p = .26 nor the second planned contrast t(114) = -.80, p = .79 
reached significance.
Including data from only the participants in the refined sample, the omnibus 
ANOVA for the overall math test was not significant F(2, 90) = .65, p = .52, η2p = .
014. Scores of participants in the women-disparaging (M = 6.06, SD = 3.62), men-
disparaging (M = 5.83, SD = 2.54), and control (M = 6.73, SD = 3.53) conditions did 
not differ from each other. Similarly, neither the first planned contrast t(90) = 1.11, p 
= .14 nor the second planned contrast t(90) = -.27, p = .61.  reached significance.
First half. Because participants scored 78% of their points on the first half of the 
problems, I conducted a second analysis of participants' scores on the first eleven 
questions. 
Although the pattern of mean scores for data with all participants was consistent 
with the systemic disadvantage hypothesis, the omnibus for the first half of the math 
test was not significant F(2, 116) = .54, p  = .58, η2p  = .009. Participants in the 
women-disparaging (M = 4.53, SD = 2.61), men-disparaging (M = 4.65, SD = 2.13), 
and control (M = 5.08, SD = 2.48) conditions did not differ. Neither the first contrast 
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t(114) = 1.02, p = .15 nor the second planned contrast t(114) = .24, p =   .41 reached 
significance.
Again, although the pattern of mean scores for participants in the refined sample 
was consistent with the systemic disadvantage hypothesis, the omnibus ANOVA of 
participants scores on the first half of the math test was not significant F(2, 90) = .84, 
p = .44, η2p = .018. Participants in the women-disparaging (M = 4.59, SD = 2.48), 
men-disparaging (M = 4.63, SD = 2.11), and control (M = 5.27, SD = 2.44) conditions 
did not significantly differ. The first planned contrast did not reach conventional 
levels of significance t(90) = 1.29, p=.10. The second planned contrast was not 
significant t(90) = .06, p = .48.
Difficult problems. Finally, because decreases in women's math performance as a 
function of stereotype or social identity threat tend to occur only on difficult problems 
under conditions of gender relevance (O'Brien & Crandall, 2003; Spencer, Steele & 
Quinn, 1999), I further limited the analysis of the first 11 questions to only those for 
which fewer than half of participants answered correctly (questions 6, 7, 9, and 11). 
Including data for all participants, the omnibus ANOVA for the difficult problems 
on the first half of the math test was not significant F(2, 116) = .68, p  = .51, η2p  = .
012. Participants in the women-disparaging (M = .50, SD = 1.34), men-disparaging 
(M = .49, SD = 1.10), and control (M = .78, SD = 1.26) conditions did not 
significantly differ. Neither the first contrast t(114) = 1.17, p = .12 nor the second 
planned contrast t(114) = -.21, p =  .51  reached significance.
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Including only participants in the refined sample, the omnibus ANOVA for the 
difficult problems on the first half of the math test (Figure 4) was not significant, F(2, 
90) = 1.40, p = .25, η2p = .030. However, the first planned was significant, t(90) = 
1.67, p = .05 indicating that women in the gender-disparaging joke conditions scored 
lower on the most difficult problems on the first half of the exam. The second planned 
contrast was not significant t(90) = -.10, p= .54. 
Figure 4: Scores on the difficult questions of SAT math exam, refined sample.
Overall, results for the math test provide no evidence for the local advantage 
hypothesis, which holds that only women-disparaging jokes, but not men-disparaging 
jokes, harm women's math test performance. In contrast, the pattern of mean scores 
on the math test is consistent with the systemic disadvantage hypothesis, which holds 
that gender disparagement humor is harmful for women's math test performance 
regardless of whether women or men are the target of that humor. However, because 
Difficult, first half
0
0.5
1
0.47 0.44
0.89
Women 
Target
Men Target
Control
35
the test of the corresponding contrast reaches conventional levels of statistical 
significance only among participants in the refined sample for a subset of difficult 
problems, evidence for the systemic disadvantage hypothesis remains weak. 
Word Completion 
Self-doubt. Including data for all participants, the omnibus ANOVA for number 
of self-doubt words did not reach significance F(2, 114) = 1.36, p  = .26, η2p  = .023. 
The first planned contrast (that participants in the women and men disparaging 
conditions would have higher scores than the control) did not reach significance, 
t(114) = -1.64, p = .95. The second planned contrast (that participants in the women-
disparaging condition would have higher scores than participants in the men-
disparaging condition) t(114) = -.20, p =  .58 did not reach significance.
Including data from only participants in the refined sample, the omnibus ANOVA 
showed no differences by condition for number of self-doubt words participants 
completed out of a possible six F(2, 90) = 1.16, p = .32, η2p = 025. Neither the first 
planned contrast t(90) = -1.49, p = .93. nor the second planned contrast t(90) = -.32, 
p = .62. reached standard levels of significance (see Table 4 for means). Moreover, to 
the extent that means in the gender-disparaging conditions differ from the control, 
they do so in the opposite direction of the systemic threat hypothesis and in no way 
support the local advantage hypothesis. 
A speculative explanation for this unexpected pattern is the framing of the word 
completion measure as a word completion test. This framing may have boosted 
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women's confidence in the gender-disparaging conditions, to the extent that gender 
was salient in the context of a verbal relevant test. This salience may be especially 
relevant for boosting women's confidence in comparison to the math test they 
previously completed. An investigation of this explanation awaits future research.
Table 4: Proportion of self-doubt and feminine words completed 
Women-
disparaging
Men-
disparaging Control
All participants
   self-doubt .76 (.89) .80 (.70) 1.06 (.95)
   feminine 1.86 (1.36) 1.77 (1.24) 1.58 (1.08)
Refined sample
   self-doubt .73(.94) .81(.75) 1.06(.98)
   feminine 1.77(1.41) 1.81(1.28) 1.59(1.10)
Feminine. Including data from all participants, the omnibus ANOVA for number 
of feminine words did not reach significance F(2, 114) = .50, p  = .61, η2p  = .009. 
The first planned contrast (that participants in the women and men disparaging 
conditions would score higher than participants in the control) did not reach 
significance,  t(114) = .95, p = .17. The second planned contrast (that participants in 
the women-disparaging condition would score higher than participants in the men-
disparaging condition) t(114) = .34, p = .37 did not reach significance.
Including only participants in the refined sample, the omnibus ANOVA showed 
no differences by condition for the number of feminine words participants completed 
F(2, 90)= .25, p = .78, η2p = .006. Neither the first planned contrast t(90) = .70, p = .
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24. nor the second planned contrast t(90) = -.12, p = .55. reached conventional levels 
of significance (see Table 4 for means). In general, participants completed very few 
feminine related words out of a possible twelve. Post-test Questionnaire
Self ratings. Means for participants' self ratings of performance, effort, and 
importance appear in Table 5. Including all participants, the omnibus ANOVA of 
self-reported performance on the math test  revealed no differences F(2, 113) = .47, p 
= .63, η2p = 008. Neither the first planned contrast (that participants in the gender-
disparaging conditions would report lower performance than the control) t(113) = 
-.68, p = .75 nor the second planned contrast (that participants in the women-
disparaging condition would report lower performance than the control) reached 
significance t(113) = .66, p = .25.
Including only participants in the refined sample, women's ratings of their own 
performance on the math test revealed no differences F(2, 89) = .94, p = .39, η2p = 
021. Neither the first planned contrast t(89) = -.63, p = 73 nor the second planned 
contrast reached significance t(89) = 1.22, p = .11.
Including data from all participants, an omnibus ANOVA of effort on the math 
test revealed no differences F (2, 114) = .07, p = .93,  η2p = .001. Neither the first 
planned contrast t(114) =.37, p = .36 nor the second planned contrast t(114) = .09, p = 
.46 reached significance.
Including data from participants in the refined sample, an omnibus ANOVA of 
effort on the math test revealed no differences by condition F (2, 90) = .06, p = .95, 
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η2p = .001. Neither the first planned contrast t(90) =.29, p = .39 nor the second 
planned contrast t(90) = .17, p = .43 reached significance.
Including data from all participants, the omnibus ANOVA of participants ratings 
of the importance of the math test did not reach significance F(2, 114) = .32, p= .73, 
η2p = .006. Neither the first planned contrast t(114)= -.48, p = .68 nor the second 
planned contrast t(114) = -.65, p = .74 reached significance.
Including participants in the refined sample, the omnibus ANOVA of women's 
ratings of the importance of the math revealed no differences F(2, 90) = .41, p= .67, 
η2p = .009. Neither the first planned contrast t(90)= -.90, p= .82 nor the second 
planned contrast t(90) = .01, p= .50 reached significance. Overall it appears that 
participants' self-reports of performance and effort on the math test as well as their 
ratings of the importance of the math test did not differ by condition.
Group comparison. To examine the questions regarding the gender which 
participants rated as better at math and word completion tests, I subtracted the 
midpoint (4, on a 1 to 7 scale) from each participant's ratings. Thus scores at 0 
indicate participants rated men and women as performing equally well, scores below 
0 indicate a rating that men do better than women, and scores above 0 indicate a 
rating that women do better than men (Table 5). 
Using these midpoint centered scores I performed one-sample t-tests that 
compared participants ratings to 0. Including data from all participants, women 
indicated that they thought men do better than women on the math test (M= -.48, SD 
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=1.22), t(115) = -4.26, p <.01. An omnibus ANOVA comparing conditions with the 
midpoint centered scores revealed no significant differences in participants' ratings of 
men's math performance relative to women's F(2, 115) = .71, p = .50, η2p = .012. 
Neither the first planned contrast (that participants reported lower ratings,  indicating 
the belief that men do better on math tests, in gender-disparaging conditions relative 
to the control) t(113) =.85, p = .20 nor the second planned contrast (that participants 
reported lower ratings in the women-disparaging condition than in the control), 
t(113) = -.80, p = .79 revealed significant differences. 
Including only data from participants in the refined sample, women indicated that 
men do better than women on the math test (M= -.46, SD=1.18), t(92) = -3.6, p <.01. 
An omnibus ANOVA comparing conditions with the midpoint centered scores 
revealed no significant differences in participants' ratings of men's math performance 
relative to women's F(2, 90) = .39, p = .68, η2p = .009. Neither the first planned 
contrast (that participants in the gender-disparaging condition would have lower 
scores, indicating men do better than women, than participants in the control 
condition)  t(90) =.88, p = .19 nor the second planned contrast (that participants in the 
women-disparaging condition would indicate lower scores than participants in the 
men-disparaging condition), t(90) = -.05, p = .52 revealed significant differences. 
These results suggest that that neither of the gender-disparaging joke conditions 
affected participants' ratings of women's relative to men's performance on the math 
test.
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I also analyzed participants midpoint centered scores for participants' comparisons 
of gender group performance on the word completion test. Including data from all 
participants, women indicated that they thought men do worse than women on the 
word completion test (M = 1.02, SD = 1.02), t(115) = 10.72, p <.01. An omnibus 
ANOVA comparing conditions with the midpoint centered scores revealed no 
significant differences in participants' ratings of men's word test performance relative 
to women's F(2, 115) = .45, p = .64, η2p = .008. Neither the first planned contrast 
t(113) = .69, p = .25  nor second planned contrast t(113) = .67, p = .25 revealed 
significant differences. 
Including data from only participants in the refined sample, women indicated that 
men do worse than women on the word completion test (M = 1.04, SD = 1.01), t(92) 
= 9.96, p <.01. An omnibus ANOVA comparing conditions with the midpoint 
centered scores revealed no significant differences in participants' ratings of men's 
word test performance relative to women's F(2, 90) = .96, p= .39, η2p = .021. Neither 
the first planned contrast t(90)= .79, p= .22 nor second planned contrast t( 90)= 1.14, 
p=.13 revealed significant differences. These results suggest that that neither of the 
gender-disparaging joke conditions affected participants' ratings of women's relative 
to men's performance on the word completion test.
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Table 5: Mean post-test ratings by condition
Women-
disparaging
Men-
disparaging Control
Self-report:
All participants
   Performance 3.14 (1.27) 3.33 (1.29) 3.06 (1.29)
   Effort 4.11 (1.45) 4.14 (1.29) 4.22 (1.31)
   Importance 4.84 (1.71) 4.57 (2.23) 4.53 (1.38)
Refined sample
   Performance 3.10 (1.24) 3.50 (1.28) 3.13 (1.29)
   Effort 4.17 (1.46) 4.23 (1.31) 4.28 (1.28)
   Importance 4.87 (1.78) 4.87 (2.31) 4.50 (1.44)
Group comparisons:
All participants
   better on math tests -.43 (1.46) -.65 (.92) -.33 (1.26)
   better on word tests .89 (1.20) 1.05 (.90) 1.11 (.98)
Refined sample
   better on math tests -.53 (1.31) -.55 (.96) -.31 (1.28)
   better on word tests .83 (1.15) 1.13 (.88) 1.16(.99)
Joke funniness effects on performance
Correlations. Because previous research documents the moderating effects of 
coping sense of humor on stereotype threat (Ford, Ferguson, Brooks, & Hagadone, 
2004), I examined the relationship between joke funniness ratings and performance (I 
report all correlations reported as one-tailed). Including data from all participants, the 
correlation between mean joke funniness ratings and overall SAT scores was 
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significant r = .16, p = .04. The correlation between funniness ratings and the first 
half of the test problems was also significant r = .17, p = .04, but the correlation 
between joke funniness ratings and the difficult, first half of problems was not 
significant r = .10, p = .15. 
Including data with only participants in the refined sample, correlations between 
funniness ratings and math test performance were not significant. The relationship 
between joke funniness ratings and overall SAT score was not significant r = .09, p  = 
.21. The relationship between joke funniness ratings and the first half of problems 
was also not significant r  = .12, p = 13. The relationship between joke funniness 
ratings and the difficult, first half of problems was also not significant r  = .09, p = .
21.
Analysis of Covariance. In addition to examining correlations between joke 
funniness ratings and performance, I also performed analyses of covariance 
(ANCOVAs) with condition as the independent variable, SAT performance as the 
dependent variable, and joke funniness ratings as the covariate. Including data from 
all participants, the ANCOVA model for overall SAT score did not reach 
significance, F (3, 116) = 1.42, p =.24; the condition effect was not significant, F(2, 
116) = .58, p = .56; and the covariate effect did not reach conventional levels of 
significance, F (1, 116) = 3.13, p = .08. Likewise, the ANCOVA model for the first 
half of the problems did not reach significance F (3, 116) = 1.38, p =.25; the 
condition effect was not significant, F(2, 116) = .47, p = .63; and the covariate effect 
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did not reach conventional levels of significance, F (1, 116) = 3.03, p = .08. Finally, 
the ANCOVA model for the difficult, first half of the problems did not reach 
significance F (3, 116) = .79, p =.50; the condition effect was not significant, F(2, 
116) = .96, p = .64; and the covariate effect did not reach significance, F (1, 116) = .
64, p = .53.
Including data from those participants in the refined sample, the ANCOVA model 
for overall SAT score did not reach significance F (3, 92) = .67, p =.57; the condition 
effect was not significant, F(2, 92) = .68, p = .51; and the covariate effect did not 
reach significance, F (1, 92) = .72, p = .40. Likewise, the ANCOVA model for the 
first half of the problems did not reach significance F (3, 92) = .98, p =.41; the 
condition effect was not significant, F(2, 92) = .82, p = .44; and the covariate effect 
did not reach significance, F (1, 116) = 1.25, p = .27. Finally, the ANCOVA model 
for the difficult, first half of the problems did not reach significance F (3, 92) = 1.15, 
p =.33; the condition effect was not significant, F(2, 92) = 1.39, p = .25; and the 
covariate effect did not reach significance, F (1, 92) = .68, p = .41.
Although funniness ratings correlate with performance with all participants 
included in analyses, it is unlikely that joke funniness ratings account for the pattern 
of differences in test performance as a function of joke condition. First, correlations 
between funniness ratings and performance are not significant among the subset of 
participants (i.e., the refined sample) for whom effects of joke condition are strongest. 
Second, joke funniness does not emerge as a significant covariate in ANCOVAs that 
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assess the effect of joke condition on test performance. Third, overall mean funniness 
ratings do not differ by joke condition so joke funniness cannot mediate any effect of 
the joke manipulation on math performance. Finally, although women in the women-
disparaging condition did rate jokes as less funny than did women in the men-
disparaging condition, women in these conditions both suffered equally strong (but 
only weakly significant) performance decrements relative to women in the control 
condition. Thus, the present research provides little evidence for the hypothesis that 
humor buffers women from the performance-harming effects of identity threat.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to investigate the harmful consequences of 
exposure to sexist humor for women's experience in a standardized testing situation. 
Common accounts of such consequences focus on the ingroup-disparaging nature of 
sexist humor—for participants in the present study, jokes that disparage women—and 
its threat to positive distinctiveness within the circumscribed local context. Implicit in 
this account is the suggestion that outgroup-disparaging humor—for participants in 
the present study, jokes that disparage men—would not have the same harmful 
consequences and might even have beneficial consequences. One source of evidence 
consistent with this account comes from joke ratings. Women found men-disparaging 
humor significantly less funny than women-disparaging humor. Another source of 
evidence comes from ratings of career interest.  Participants in the men-disparaging 
condition indicated significantly more interest in a variety of careers, but especially 
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masculine gendered careers, than did participants in the women-disparaging and 
control conditions. This pattern suggests some evidence for the local advantage 
hypothesis because outgroup-disparaging, positive-distinctiveness-inducing humor 
increased women's interest in masculine careers. However, results for other outcomes 
provided no evidence for the local advantage hypothesis. 
In contrast to common accounts, a sociocultural approach to systemic 
oppression suggests that the harmful effects of sexist humor may partly lie not in the 
dynamics of local positive distinctiveness, but instead in the broader meaning of 
sexist humor in male-dominated domains like math. From this perspective, 
detrimental effects of sexist humor arise to the extent that they are linked to broader 
systems of oppression that devalue women and privilege men. One implication of this 
perspective is that exposure to sexist jokes will have harmful consequences for 
women, even when the humor disparages the systemically advantaged outgroup (in 
the present study, men-disparaging jokes). 
Evidence for this account comes from two sources. One source is perceptions of 
unfairness of standardized tests. Participants in the women-disparaging and 
participants in the men-disparaging conditions rated standardized tests significantly 
more unfair than participants in the control condition. A second, but relatively weak, 
source comes from scores on the mathematics test. Participants in the men-
disparaging and women-disparaging conditions performed worse than participants in 
the control condition, although this contrast was significant only among participants 
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in the refined sample, only for difficult problems on the first half of the test, and only 
evaluating contrasts using one-tailed probabilities..
Limitations and Future Directions
To my knowledge, this is the first study to examine consequences of exposure to 
sexist humor on women's experience of a standardized test setting. Results of this 
initial study provided some evidence that exposure to sexist humor impacts 
perception of the unfairness of standardized tests and performance on difficult math 
problems. However, this evidence was limited, especially in the case of math test 
performance. A conclusive investigation of these ideas awaits additional research.
Besides relatively weak effects, the procedure of the present study had additional 
limitations that make replication especially desirable. First, analyses excluded 
numerous participants who failed to recall gender-disparaging jokes or to identify the 
joke treatment they received despite a prompt describing each condition. While it is 
not important that participants identify the jokes as negative or sexist it is important 
that they read and pay attention to the jokes. A future study might adjust the 
procedure by adding a more impactful manipulation of sexist humor, one that 
participants will read with greater attention.
Second, I evaluated planned contrasts with relatively liberal, one-tailed tests. 
While one-tailed tests are acceptable in terms of theory, publication outlets often 
demand more stringent two-tailed tests (see Furr & Rosenthal, 2003, footnote 1). In 
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light of publication traditions, one must regard results of the present study—
particularly for career choice and test performance—as especially tentative.  
Third, the internal consistency of various composite measures, especially the 
masculine career composite, was weak. A future study might expand the career 
measure to include a larger number of careers that a consensus of students consider 
masculine. Another measure, the feminine and self-doubt word completion measure 
produced very little if any results. A more appropriate measure that would not fall 
victim to ceiling and floor effects could highlight whether self-doubt and feminine 
activation are related to the outcome measures. 
Besides further investigation of exposure to sexist humor and its consequences for 
women's experience, an important direction for future research is to investigate 
consequences for men's experience. Because the present study was an initial attempt 
to examine effects of simultaneous privilege and disadvantage on motivation and 
performance I chose to include only women participants. However, past research 
(Adams et al., 2006) revealed that exposure to a suggestion of a female instructor’s 
sexism did not harm men's performance on a standardized test, but may instead have 
benefited men's performance, relative to men who were not exposed to a suggestion 
of sexism. Past research on the rejection identification model also finds that unlike 
women, mens psychological well-being is unrelated to perceived discrimination 
because the relative meaning of discrimination has little total relevance (Schmitt et al, 
2002). Based on these results (Adams et al., 2006; Schmitt et al., 2002) and the results 
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of the present study, one can hypothesize that men are likely to incur positive 
outcomes in the domain of performance, or at least be buffered from negative 
outcomes, as a result of men-disparaging or women-disparaging humor. 
A third direction for future research on sexist humor is to measure both domain 
and gender identification (e.g. Collective Self Esteem, Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). 
Previous research emphasizes that level of identification with the targeted group 
mediates the effects of identity threat (Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmader, 2002). For 
example, in the present study, one can hypothesize a moderating effect of gender 
identification such that the effects of gendered humor on career choice, test 
performance, and perceptions of fairness will be greater for highly identified 
participants than for less identified participants. Alternatively, one can hypothesize a 
mediating effect of gender identification. If disparagement humor (whether women-
disparaging or in general) threatens women's identity in the math test situation, this 
effect on identification may mediate effects of the joke manipulation on career 
choice, test performance, and perceptions of fairness. Adding a measure of gender 
identification will permit a test of these hypothesis. 
In addition to gender identification, future research could also incorporate domain 
identification. Previous research highlights that detrimental effects on performance 
outcomes, such as those resulting from stereotype threat, are most impactful for 
individuals highly identified with the stereotyped domain (Steele et al., 2002). For 
example, in the present study, one can hypothesize that the effects of gendered humor 
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on math test performance and perceptions of fairness will be greater for participants 
highly identified with mathematics. Adding a measure of mathematics identification 
and recruiting participants with varying levels of mathematics identification will 
permit a test of this hypothesis.
Theoretical Implications
Despite its preliminary nature and tentative results, the present study helps to 
illuminate important theoretical questions. I conclude with a consideration of these 
questions.
Local and Systemic Manifestations of Oppression
Common accounts often imply that expressions of oppression are direct acts of 
differential treatment or local dynamics of intergroup distinctiveness in bounded 
situations. In contrast, a sociocultural approach suggests that detrimental effects of 
oppression are not limited to direct acts of differential treatment or local dynamics of 
distinctiveness. Instead, broader awareness of systemic oppression can cause harm, 
even in situations which hostile discrimination is absent and that afford local positive 
distinctiveness. Results of the present study provide tentative evidence consistent 
with this account. 
This pattern—that relatively distal implications of broader systemic forces might 
have more impact in determining the effects of sexist humor on perceptions of 
fairness and performance outcomes than the proximal impact of outgroup derogation 
or ingroup favoritism on positive distinctiveness—is noteworthy to the extent that it 
50
contradicts conventional wisdom in social psychology and society at large. That is, 
conventional wisdom suggests that proximal forces should exert greater influence on 
outcomes than distal forces. Within social psychology, social impact theory (Latané, 
1981) postulates that the impact of social forces on a target should be a function of 
the strength, immediacy, and number of those forces. In contrast, the present study 
follows the constructivist tradition of social psychology (Ross & Nisbett, 1991), 
which holds that the impact of social forces is not just about strength, immediacy, and 
number, but also their subjective meaning. What a sociocultural perspective adds to 
constructivist perspectives in social psychology is a focus on the broader meanings 
that people apply to make sense of events in the circumscribed, experimental setting.
Implications for Different Outcomes
One idea that emerges from the present study is that the relative impact of local 
and systemic forces may vary depending on the outcome in question. Specifically, 
motivation and interest may be sensitive to manipulations of local privilege and 
disadvantage, but intellectual performance may be sensitive to broader systemic 
manifestations of privilege and disadvantage.
Motivation and interest. The career measure served as a measure of women's 
interest in pursuing various careers. Results of the career measure indicated that the 
men-derogating jokes increased women's interest in masculine gendered careers 
relative to both neither-gender jokes and women-derogating jokes. This suggests that, 
in regards to motivation and interest within the circumscribed testing situation, 
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women's experience of local advantage (in the form of positive distinctiveness via 
outgroup derogation of men-disparaging jokes) can have a greater impact than the 
broader systemic devaluation implicit in the invocation of sexist humor. However, 
considering the impact of local forces, it is important that women-disparaging humor 
did not appear to decrease women's interest in careers relative to the control. 
This pattern—relatively greater impact of local rather than systemic forces on 
experience of motivation and interest—is consistent with previous research 
comparing local and systemic manifestations of privilege and disadvantage (Adams et 
al., 2006). Men reported lower comfort in response to a local manifestation of 
disadvantage (exposure to the suggestion of a female instructor's sexism), just as 
women in the present study reported greater interest in masculine careers in response 
to a local manifestation of privilege.
Performance outcomes. In contrast to motivation and interest outcomes, 
performance related outcomes suggested a different pattern of results. Ratings of 
unfairness of standardized tests and the math test served as measures of women’s 
performance related outcomes. Results of the unfairness ratings suggested that the 
men-derogating and women-derogating jokes increased women’s perception of the 
trickiness of standardized tests relative to the control jokes. The pattern of results for 
the standardized math test suggested the men-derogating and women-derogating 
jokes decreased women’s performance on the more difficult math problems relative 
to the control. Together this pattern of results suggests that, in regards to performance 
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related outcomes, women’s experience of systemic disadvantage may have a greater 
impact than the local circumscribed context.
This pattern—greater impact of systemic forces rather than local forces on 
intellectual performance outcomes—is also consistent with previous research 
comparing local and systemic manifestations of privilege and disadvantage (Adams et 
al., 2006). Men exposed to the suggestion of a female instructor's sexism were 
apparently buffered from performance detriments as a result of the systemic context, 
just as women in the present study incurred negative performance outcomes as a 
result of the systemic context, namely increased ratings of unfairness of standardized 
tests and decreased performance. 
What is the explanation for the differential effects of local and systemic forces. 
Perhaps the differential effects result from the relatively explicit nature of the 
outcomes. Specifically the more explicitly controlled motivational measures, such as 
ratings of career interest and comfort, may be more sensitive to the impact of the local 
context. However the less explicitly controlled performance measures, such as the 
math and logic test scores, may be more sensitive to the impact of the systemic 
context. 
Whatever the explanation for the differential effect of the joke manipulation on 
different outcomes, it suggests an ironic conclusion. The same humor that increases 
women's interest and motivation to pursue masculine careers—that is, men-
disparaging jokes—may also decrease performance on the math test. To the extent 
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that interest and motivation to pursue masculine gendered careers is related to 
identification in those career domains, this finding appears similar to research on 
stereotype threat. Stereotype threat research reveals that those individuals most 
identified with the testing domain are most affected by stereotype threat (Steele, 
2002). However in this case of sexist humor, the motivation was a momentary 
situational increase in interest rather than long-term domain identification.
Broader Implications
An important implication of the present research is that even apparently positive 
treatment, such as men-disparaging humor, can have negative effects on performance 
because such treatment is understood in terms of the larger sociocultural climate 
beyond the local situation. This is an important implication since many conceptions 
of sexism locate oppression in relatively individualistic terms. Because such atomistic 
conceptions fail to locate the roots of oppression and fail to point out the full impact 
of oppression they are also inadequate for reducing oppression. Focusing solely on 
individualistic forms of oppression leads to omission of its systemic roots and the 
dangers of excluding a focus on oppression's systemic roots are at least twofold. First, 
an individualistic focus may lead people to underestimate the full impact of 
oppression because the impacts of systemic oppression are left out. Second, an 
individualistic focus may lead people to express less support for policies designed to 
reduce oppression (Adams et al., 2008; Adams, Edkins, Lacka, & Pickett, 2008). This 
reduced support for policies may result from underestimation of the effects of 
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systemic oppression, and therefore underestimation of the need for such policies. 
However, reduced policy support may also result from lack of systemic understanding 
of oppression which lead to misunderstanding of how policies designed to ameliorate 
effects of systemic oppression are to work.
Although positive treatment may have negative effects due to the larger 
sociocultural climate, privileging women in local contexts may be helpful in 
increasing motivation and interest in careers otherwise considered male-gendered. 
However the downside of this local privilege is that it may actually harm women's 
performance. A change in systemic forces, perhaps through an increase in social 
representations of women in male-gendered fields, is necessary to eliminate sexism 
and other forms of oppression.
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Appendix A: Joke Funniness rating measures for manipulation of joke disparagement 
target.
I. Women-disparaging condition
Instructions: We are examining what is considered "funny" to students at the 
University of Kansas. By circling a number on the scale provided please rate YOUR 
opinion of the following statements.
1. A professor was administering a big test one day to the class. After handing 
out all of the tests the professor waited at the front desk. Once the test was over, the 
students all handed the tests back in. The professor noticed that one of the students 
had attached a $100 bill to their test with a note saying "A dollar per point." The next 
class the professor handed the tests back out. The student got back the test and $56 
change.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
2. Q: Why did the Martian lawyer go to court?
A: To settle a space suit.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
3. TIPS TO IMPROVE YOUR WRITING
(1) Eliminate quotations. As Ralph Waldo Emerson said, "I hate quotations. 
Tell me what you know."
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(2) Don't be redundant; don't use more words than necessary; it's highly 
superfluous.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(3) One-word sentences? Eliminate.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(4) Don't overuse exclamation marks!!!
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(5) Last but not least, avoid cliches like the plague; They're old hat; seek 
viable alternatives.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
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4. A couple was arrested in the parking lot of a large mall in Lakeland, Fla., just 
before Christmas when, attempting to steal an automobile at random, they tried to 
break into a police van containing three officers on a stakeout.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
5. Q: How do you know when a woman is about to say something smart? 
A: When she starts her sentence with "A man once told me ...."
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
6. Q: What do you call cheese that is not yours?
A: Nacho (not yo) cheese.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
7. WHAT A WOMAN REALLY MEANS WHEN SHE SAYS…
(1) 'It would take to long to explain.'
Really means… 'I have no idea how it works.'
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(2) 'Uh huh,' 'Sure, honey,' or 'Yes, dear. '
Really means…Absolutely nothing. It's a conditioned response.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(3) 'I'm getting more exercise lately. '
Really means… 'The batteries in the remote are dead. '
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(4) 'Thanks'
Really means… She is thanking you. Don't show your surprise just say you're 
welcome.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
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II. Men-disparaging condition 
Instructions:We are examining what is considered "funny" to students at the 
University of Kansas. By circling a number on the scale provided please rate YOUR 
opinion of the following statements.
1. A professor was administering a big test one day to the class. After handing 
out all of the tests the professor waited at the front desk. Once the test was over, the 
students all handed the tests back in. The professor noticed that one of the students 
had attached a $100 bill to their test with a note saying "A dollar per point." The next 
class the professor handed the tests back out. The student got back the test and $56 
change.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
2. Q: Why did the Martian lawyer go to court?
A: To settle a space suit.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
3. TIPS TO IMPROVE YOUR WRITING
(1) Eliminate quotations. As Ralph Waldo Emerson said, "I hate quotations. 
Tell me what you know."
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(2) Don't be redundant; don't use more words than necessary; it's highly 
superfluous.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(3) One-word sentences? Eliminate.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(4) Don't overuse exclamation marks!!!
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(5) Last but not least, avoid cliches like the plague; They're old hat; seek 
viable alternatives.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
4. A couple was arrested in the parking lot of a large mall in Lakeland, Fla., just 
before Christmas when, attempting to steal an automobile at random, they tried to 
break into a police van containing three officers on a stakeout.
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Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
5. Q: How do you know when a man is about to say something smart? 
A: When he starts his sentence with "A woman once told me ...."
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
6. Q: What do you call cheese that is not yours?
A: Nacho (not yo) cheese.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
7. WHAT A MAN REALLY MEANS WHEN HE SAYS…
(1) 'It would take to long to explain. '
Really means… 'I have no idea how it works. '
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
 (2) 'Uh huh, ' 'Sure, honey, ' or 'Yes, dear. '
Really means…Absolutely nothing. It's a conditioned response.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(3) 'I'm getting more exercise lately. '
Really means… 'The batteries in the remote are dead. '
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(4) 'Thanks'
Really means… He is thanking you. Don't show your surprise just say you're 
welcome.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
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III. Control condition 
Instructions:We are examining what is considered "funny" to students at the 
University of Kansas. By circling a number on the scale provided please rate YOUR 
opinion of the following statements.
1. A professor was administering a big test one day to the class. After handing 
out all of the tests the professor waited at the front desk. Once the test was over, the 
students all handed the tests back in. The professor noticed that one of the students 
had attached a $100 bill to their test with a note saying "A dollar per point." The next 
class the professor handed the tests back out. The student got back the test and $56 
change.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
2. Q: Why did the Martian lawyer go to court?
A: To settle a space suit.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
3. TIPS TO IMPROVE YOUR WRITING
(1) Eliminate quotations. As Ralph Waldo Emerson said, "I hate quotations. 
Tell me what you know."
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(2) Don't be redundant; don't use more words than necessary; it's highly 
superfluous.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(3) One-word sentences? Eliminate.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(4) Don't overuse exclamation marks!!!
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
(5) Last but not least, avoid cliches like the plague; They're old hat; seek 
viable alternatives.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
4. A couple was arrested in the parking lot of a large mall in Lakeland, Fla., just 
before Christmas when, attempting to steal an automobile at random, they tried to 
break into a police van containing three officers on a stakeout.
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Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
5. Q: What do you call a group of chess grandmasters bragging about their 
recent tournaments in the hotel lobby?
A: Chess nuts boasting on an open foyer.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
6. Q: What do you call cheese that is not yours?
A: Nacho (not yo) cheese.
Not at all funny  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely funny
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Appendix B: Career interest measure 
Please rate the following careers to the degree that you are likely to consider pursing 
them. (Note: this list is a subset of possible careers and so many are not included.)1= 
not at all likely to pursue; 7= very likely to pursue.
not at all likely                     very likely
1. Caseworker  F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Day care center director  F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Employment counselor  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Probation/parole officer M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Youth counselor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Psychiatric social worker 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Criminologist 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. Child development specialist 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Neuropsychologist 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Stockbroker 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Training specialist N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. Market research analyst 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Systems analyst 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Consumer psychologist N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. Computer programmer M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. Community organizer/
planning specialist 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. Relocation worker 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. Field health officer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. Health policy planner N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. Teacher (K-12) F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. School psychologist (K-12) F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. School counselor (K-12) F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. Consumer researcher N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24. Statistical report writer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. Technical writer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. Media director N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27. Public opinion survey worker N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28. Attorney 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Appendix C: Pre-test measure of self-handicapping and unfairness of tests
As you know student life is sometimes stressful, and we may not always get enough 
sleep, etc. Such things can affect cognitive functioning, so it is necessary to ask how 
prepared you feel.
1. How many hours did you sleep last night? _________ hours
2. How able to focus do you feel?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
unable to very able
focus at all                         to focus
3. How much stress have you been under lately?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
no stress very much
at all                                       stress
4. How tricky/unfair do you typically find standardized tests?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all   very 
tricky / unfair                         tricky / unfair
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Appendix D: SAT math test
Math Test
Directions: Solve each problem and decide which is the best of the given choices.  
Circle the letter of the correct answer. You have 25 minutes to complete this test.
1. If 2x + y = 19 and x – y = 5, what is y?
a. 3
b. 5
c. 8
d. 13
e. 19
2. In the figure above, l║m and ΔABC is an isosceles right triangle. What is <x ?
a. 15°
b. 30°
c. 45°
d. 60°
e. 90°
3. Point P is at (-5, 17) and point Q is at (4√3, 6). How many lines can you draw 
that pass through both point P and point Q?
a. 0
b. 1
c. 2
d. 3
e. 4
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reptiles
mammals
birds
fish
4. The figure above shows the overall holdings of a zoo. The zoo has the same 
number of reptiles and fish, 20 mammals, and four times as many birds as 
mammals. If the number of reptiles is ¾ the number of birds, how many fish 
are in the zoo?
a. 20
b. 40
c. 60
d. 80
e. 100
5. The sum of four consecutive prime numbers is 72. What is the smallest of 
these numbers?
a. 2
b. 11
c. 13
d. 19
e. 23
72
6. In the figure above, AB = 4 and BC = 3. The center of the circle lies on line 
AC. What is the circumference of the circle?
a. 3π
b. 3π2
c. 4π
d. 5π
e. 5π2
7. The mean of a set of 10 numbers is 18. When you remove the smallest 3 of 
these numbers, the mean of the remaining numbers is 22. What is the sum of 
the smallest 3 numbers?
a. 9
b. 10
c. 18
d. 22
e. 26
8. Define f(x, y) = x2 – xy. For which of the below values of x and y is f(x, y) the 
largest?
a. x = 3, y = -3
b. x = 3, y = 3
c. x = -3, y = 0
d. x = -3, y = -3
e. x = 0, y = 3
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Note: Figure not drawn to scale.
9. In the figure above, ΔABC and ΔEBD are similar triangles. BD = CD = 1 and 
AC = 1.5. What is the area of rectangle CDEF?
a. .5
b. .75
c. 1
d. 1.5
e. 2.25
10. A jar contains a mix of black beans and white beans. There are 16 white beans 
in the jar. When you reach into the jar and draw out a bean at random, the 
probability of drawing a black bean is 75%. How many total beans are in the 
jar?
a. 8
b. 12
c. 16
d. 32
e. 64
11. Define ♪ as follows: x ♪ y = | x – y |. If 3 ♪ z = 5 and z ♪ w = 2, which of these 
is a possible value for w?
a. -5
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b. -4
c. -2
d. 5
e. 8
12. Let f(x) = x2 + ax + b. If the zeroes of this polynomial are at -4 and -2, what is 
f(9)?
a. 35
b. 81
c. 90
d. 143
e. 181
13. A fair coin is tossed eight times. What is the probability that only one of the 
tosses will come up heads?
a. 1/256
b. 1/64
c. 1/32
d. 1/16
e. 1/8
14. m is 250% of n, and 15% of n is 45. What is 12% of m?
a. 12
b. 30
c. 90
d. 120
e. 450
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15. The greatest common factor of the integers a and b is 7, and the least common 
multiple of a and b is 210. The value of a is 14. What is the value of b?
a. 7
b. 14
c. 35
d. 105
e. 210
16. The figure above shows a circle with its center at O with four identical 
isosceles triangles inscribed in the circle. The distance AB is 2√2 units. What 
is the area of the shaded region?
a. 8
b. 4/π
c. 4√2
d. 16π – 8
e. 4π – 8
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Note: Figure not drawn to scale.
17. In the figure above, OA = 5 and the area of the sector OAB is 5π. What is the 
length of the arc AB?
a. 2
b. 2π
c. 4
d. 4π
e. 5π
18. The summer reading shelf at the library contains 30 books. A student must 
select three books to read over the summer. How many different sets of three 
books could the student select?
a. 6
b. 812
c. 4,060
d. 8,120
e. 24,360
19. A circle has a diameter that is a positive integer, and an area that is less than 
10 units. How many different circles fulfill this condition?
a. one
b. two
c. three
d. four
e. five
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  1983   1984   1985   1986   1987
 = 50,000 autos
20. Referring to the figure above, what was the average annual sales growth 
between 1985 and 1987?
a. 75,000
b. 50,000
c. 40,000
d. 25,000
e. 10,000
21. The union of sets A and B is {1, 3, 7, 11, 14, 17, 22}. The intersection of sets 
A and B is {7, 11, 22}. Set A is {1, 3, 11, 22}. What is set B?
a. {7, 11, 22}
b. {7, 11, 14, 17, 22}
c. {14, 17, 22}
d. {14, 17}
e. {1, 3, 7, 22}
22. Lines l and m are parallel and intersect the y axis two units apart from each 
other. The equation of line l is y = -2x + 4. Which of these could be the 
equation of line m?
a. y = - ½ x + 4
b. y = ½ x + 4
c. y = 2x + 2
d. y = 2x – 2
e. y = x  + 4
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Appendix E: Word completion measure 
Word Generation Test
Directions: Write letters in the provided blanks to form complete words. Use all  
of the blanks when forming each word. Only complete one word per problem. It  
should take about 5 seconds per word.
1. _ _ _ A N
2. S _ _ T E _
3. _ _ _ S I V E
4. _ I N K
5. S H A _ _
6. G _ _ L
7. _ I F E
8. F A _ _
9. D _ L _
10. F _ _ _ L E
11. L O _ _ _ _
12. S _ F _
13. D U _ _
14. _ _ _ _ C A T E
15. _ A R D
16. _ _ _ R T
17. _ _ I D E
18. W _ _ K
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Appendix F: Post test questionnaire of self ratings and group comparisons
POST TEST QUESTIONAIRE
Now that you have completed the tests, please answer the following questions using 
the provided scales.
MATH TEST QUESTIONS:
1. Compared to other KU students, how would you rate your performance on the 
math test?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
extremely extremely  
   poor    excellent
2. How much effort did you apply to the math test?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    very little       very much
3. How important is it to you that you perform well on tests like the math test? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
     not at all        extremely
    important important
WORD COMPLETION TEST QUESTIONS:
4. Compared to other KU students, how would you rate your performance on the 
word completion test?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
extremely extremely  
   poor    excellent
5. How much effort did you apply to the word completion test?
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    very little       very much
6. How important is it to you that you perform well on tests like the word completion 
test? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
     not at all        extremely
    important important
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7. Who do you think generally performs better on MATH tests like the one you 
completed?
a)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
      English majors              Psychology majors        
b)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
     KU students              K-State Students    
c)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    High school math teachers              Engineers    
d)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
     Men              Women    
e)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    18 year-olds                        58 year-olds 
8. Who do you think generally performs better on WORD COMPLETION tests like 
the one you completed?
a)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
      English majors      Psychology majors 
b)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
     KU students          K-State Students 
c)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  High school math teachers                   Engineers    
d)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
     Men              Women    
e)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    18 year-olds                        58 year-olds 
